Commentary by MEMRI Staff
Under pressure from Iran, and in an attempt to prevent Ayad Allawi from forming a new government despite his emergence from the general election with the largest number of seats, the two leading Shi'a groups, the Iraqi National Alliance and the State of Law, amidst great public display of fraternity, decided to combine their forces into a new alliance, thereby supplanting Al-Iraqiya as the largest group in parliament.
From the outset, the Alliance was fragile and ridden by conflicts and dissention over the central issue of selecting a consensus candidate for the post of prime minister which was the reason for its creation in the first place.
The Iraqi National Alliance, like most of the "alliances" in the current Iraqi political culture, is not a cohesive or a coherent political body. In fact, it comprises three major groups – the Supreme Islamic Council (SIC), the Sadrist Movement, and the Badr Organization, formerly the militia group associated with SIC and at least two or three other, smaller groups.
The three components of the Alliance have two traits in common: First, they are closely allied with Iran which probably finances their political activities; and second, they are strongly opposed to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki staying in power for a second term. SIC supports Adel Abd Al-Mahdi, the current vice president, while the Sadrists support a former prime minister, Dr. Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, perhaps one of the most pro-Iranian politicians on the Iraqi political scene.
By contrast, the State of Law insists that its candidate, Al-Maliki, should be the only candidate for the new Alliance, and be given a chance to stay on the job for a second term. Al-Maliki's supporters were prepared to accept a diminution of some of his powers to mollify his opponents in the joint Alliance. This concession did not satisfy his opponents. They are aware that Al-Maliki has been weakened by the recent acts of terrorism in Baghdad and by the growing "electricity intifada" [uprising] sweeping many parts of Iraq.
The situation could become even murkier if one accepts a story published today in the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat daily stating that elements from Al-Maliki's the Islamic Da'wa party, the principal nucleus of the State of Law, have indicated that Al-Maliki would agree to concede as a candidate for the post of prime minister if he was guaranteed that no legal proceedings will be initiated against him and against members of his family after he leaves office. Of course, Al-Maliki has every reason to be concerned, because it is an open secret that his son, who is the chief procurement official in the government, has accumulated enormous wealth, much of which is invested in real estate outside Iraq. Al-Maliki's partners in the Alliance refused to make such a commitment because this would be tantamount to politicizing the judicial system which ought to remain independent.
In the meantime, the stalemate persists and the danger of a sectarian flare-up upon the departure of the main fighting units of U.S. forces from Iraq in August. The U.S. administration will have to decide, and quite soon, whether adhering to the withdrawal schedule at a cost of leaving Iraq in a political shambles would be a wise decision. Their only hope that at the very last moment the leading Shi'a cleric in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani will come to the rescue.
A leading figure of the State of Law had a private meeting with Al-Sistani yesterday to discuss the political crisis, but no statement was issued afterwards to indicate what Al-Sistani's position might have been. There is a growing realization among political analysts and commentators in Iraq that sooner or later the marja'iyah [the highest Shia religious authority] would lend its support to a candidate who will then be anointed as prime minister.
As we reported earlier this week in this blog, the French ambassador to Iraq has delivered a verbal note to the marja'iya from President Nicholas Sarkozy (see France Assures Najaf That Its Position On Iran's Nuclear Program Isn't Against Shi'a) thanking them for supporting the political stability in Iraq. This may be the way to go.
These comments draw on articles in Al-Rafidayn, June 24, 2010; alsumarianews.com, June 24; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, June 25, 2010; and uragency.net June 24, 2010
